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CRIMINAL LAW—“BUT I DIDN’T KNOW WHO HE WAS!”:
WHAT IS THE REQUIRED MENS REA FOR AN AIDER AND ABETTOR
OF A FELON IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM?
INTRODUCTION
Adam stands outside a post office holding a handgun under his
jacket. He slides the weapon out from under his jacket and hands it
to his partner, Pete. This is not Pete’s first turn at this game. Ten
years ago he was convicted of armed robbery of a post office, a
federal felony offense carrying a penalty of up to five years in
prison.1 A moment later, Pete runs into the post office, brandishing
the gun at the postal workers, and takes fistfuls of money from the
cash register. Adam stands lookout. A witness on the street sees
the encounter and phones the police. Within minutes the police
arrive, and the two men are arrested.
Each man faces a litany of charges. Pete is charged with,
among other crimes, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)—being a con
victed felon in possession of a firearm2—a crime punishable, under
18 U.S.C. § 924(b), by up to ten years in prison and a $10,000 fine.3
Whether Pete, as the principal offender, knew he was a convicted
1.

18 U.S.C. § 2115 (2006). The statute provides,
Whoever forcibly breaks into or attempts to break into any post office, or
any building used in whole or in part as a post office, with intent to commit in
such post office, or building or part thereof, so used, any larceny or other
depredation, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
Id.
2.

Id. § 922(g)(1). The statute provides,
It shall be unlawful for any person—(1) who has been convicted in any
court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year
. . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or
affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce.
Id.
3.

Id. § 924(b). The statute provides,
Whoever, with intent to commit therewith an offense punishable by im
prisonment for a term exceeding one year, or with knowledge or reasonable
cause to believe that an offense punishable by imprisonment for a term ex
ceeding one year is to be committed therewith, ships, transports, or receives a
firearm or any ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce shall be fined
under this title, or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
Id.
245
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felon is of no matter; he is strictly liable so long as he willfully pos
sessed the firearm.4 As is customary with federal crimes involving
multiple defendants, our original character, Adam, faces a charge of
aiding and abetting the crimes with which his partner is charged and
is subject to the same punishment.5 Among the crimes he will be
charged with is aiding and abetting a felon in possession of a fire
arm.6 If he can convince a jury that he did not know his partner
was a convicted felon, can Adam avoid a conviction on this charge?
What is the required “mens rea”7 for this crime?
Due to a split among the federal courts of appeals, the answer
to that question depends upon where the alleged crime was commit
ted.8 For example, if the post office had been located in Jackson
ville, Florida, Adam could still receive up to ten years in prison for
aiding and abetting alone even if he can convince a jury that he had
no knowledge of his partner’s criminal record.9 This is because the
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have not read mens rea into the statute
beyond knowledge that the individual in question has aided the
principal in the possession of a firearm.10 Set this hypothetical in
Knoxville, Tennessee, and proof that Adam had no prior knowl
edge of his partner’s record may spare him the conviction because
4.
5.

See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
18 U.S.C. § 2. The statute provides,
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed
by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable
as a principal.
Id.; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 81 (9th ed. 2009) (defining aid and abet: “[t]o
assist or facilitate the commission of a crime, or to promote its accomplishment”).
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 2.
7. Latin for “guilty mind,” Black’s Law Dictionary defines mens rea as
[t]he state of mind that the prosecution, to secure a conviction, must prove
that a defendant had when committing a crime; criminal intent or recklessness
<the mens rea for theft is the intent to deprive the rightful owner of the prop
erty>. Mens rea is the second of two essential elements of every crime at com
mon law, the other being the actus reus—Also termed mental element;
criminal intent; guilty mind.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1075 (9th ed. 2009).
8. See United States v. Samuels, 521 F.3d 804, 811-12 (7th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Lesure, 262 F. App’x 135, 142-43 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Gardner,
488 F.3d 700, 720 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1286-87 (3d Cir.
1993); United States v. Canon, 993 F.2d. 1439, 1442 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Moore, 936 F.2d 1508, 1525-28 (7th Cir. 1991).
9. See Lesure, 262 F. App’x at 142-43.
10. See id.; Canon, 993 F.2d. at 1442; Moore, 936 F.2d at 1508; see also discussion
infra Part III.A.
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the Sixth Circuit, along with the Third and Seventh Circuits, has
ruled that some greater knowledge than merely acting to make the
possession come about is required for a conviction on the charge of
aiding and abetting a felon in possession of a firearm.11 What if the
robbery had occurred in Springfield, Massachusetts? The First Cir
cuit and all other circuits not previously mentioned have yet to ad
dress this question, leaving speculation as to the future of this issue
in those circuits.
Until Congress acts, this issue will remain one of judicial inter
pretation. Thus far, five circuits have ruled on the issue, and each
has used a different reasoning.12 A congressional amendment or
overhaul of the law in this area is required. This Note will argue
that until such a time as Congress addresses this issue, courts con
fronted with this issue should find that the alleged aider must have
some greater knowledge than merely that the principal is a felon in
possession of a firearm.13 Though Congress has left the courts with
an unclear view of its intention, the Third and Sixth Circuits pro
vide a logical solution and predictable standard that other courts
should follow.
Those courts of appeals that propose a standard that does not
require knowledge of the principal’s status as a felon point to the
general aiding and abetting statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2, which requires
that aiders and abettors be treated as principals.14 This analysis is
too simplistic and fails to recognize the broad scope of the Gun
Control Act of 196815 and the subsequent Firearms Owners Protec
tion Act.16 Further, it is felled by the fact that to enforce this read
ing of the issue, the courts must read certain aspects of the law in
this area out of the United States Code (the “Code”) or as redun
dancies within the Code. This is an inadequate reading of the issue.
This Note will first set out the history of aiding and abetting
law, as well as the history of the felon-in-possession statute. This
discussion will demonstrate the strength of the proposition that
some knowledge beyond mere knowledge of possession of the fire
arm must be required to convict for aiding and abetting a felon in
11. Gardner, 488 F.3d at 715; Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1286-87; see Samuels, 521 F.3d at
811-12; see also discussion infra Part III.B.
12. See discussion infra Part III.
13. Gardner, 488 F.3d at 715; Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1286-87; see Samuels, 521 F.3d at
811-812; see also discussion infra Part III.B.
14. See discussion infra Part II.A.
15. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213.
16. Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2006)).

\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-1\WNE107.txt

248

unknown

Seq: 4

4-MAY-10

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

16:04

[Vol. 32:245

possession of a firearm. This Note will then discuss relevant case
law and the methods of statutory interpretation. Finally, this Note
will present several hypothetical fact patterns that will demonstrate
the problems inherent in the jurisdictions requiring no knowledge
beyond that of possession, and the strengths—and shortcomings—
of jurisdictions ruling that an alleged aider must have some knowl
edge of the principal offender’s status as a convicted felon.
This Note recommends that some greater knowledge than
merely knowingly taking action that places the felon in possession
of the firearm must be required; that is to say that the knowledge of
the aider as to the felon status of the principal is an issue that the
courts and juries must consider. However, ultimately this Note im
plores Congress to clarify the issue by directly addressing the felonin-possession statute and its relation to aiding and abetting law and
its ancient roots.17
I.

18 U.S.C. § 2—HISTORY AND ANALYSIS
ABETTING LAW

OF

AIDING

AND

The concept of accomplice liability predates American law.18
In United States v. Peoni, a preeminent case in the area of aiding
and abetting law, Judge Learned Hand traced the long history of
aiding and abetting law as far back as Fourteenth Century En
gland.19 In both the United States and England, a long tradition of
17. While this Note will take a unique angle of analysis on this issue—including
addressing the potentially contradictory rulings of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit—it is not the first piece of scholarship to address the split and its consequences.
See Stephen R. Klein, Note, A Shot at Mens Rea in Aiding and Abetting Illegal Firearms
Possession Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), 7 AVE MARIA L. REV. 639 (2009). In his Note,
Klein argues that “the split should be resolved legislatively by restricting § 922(g)
charges via § 2(a).” Id. at 641. Klein, who presents his Note from a solidly pro-gun
owners’-rights point of view concludes that congressional action is necessary to create
uniformity on this matter. Id. at 665-66. He reasons that it is in the best interests of
those advocating gun owner rights to require a knowledge element, as a failure to do so
could be used against lawful gun owners by gun control advocates. Id. at 667.
This Note will not offer a political or ideological opinion on this matter, nor will it
suggest a particular politically motivated amendment. It will, however, seek to address
uniformity and fairness in this issue.
18. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938); see also Baruch
Weiss, What Were They Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider and Abettor and
Causer Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341, 1344 (2002).
19. Peoni, 100 F.2d at 402. The court noted,
The substance of that formula goes back a long way. Pollock & Maitland, Vol.
II, p. 507, in speaking of the English law at the beginning of the 14th Century,
say that already ‘the law of homicide is quite wide enough to comprise . . .
those who have ‘procured, counselled, commanded or abetted’ the felony’; cit
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common-law aiding and abetting law exists.20 English common law
separated the parties to a felony into four categories: principals who
committed the crime, principals who were present at the scene and
aided and abetted the commission of the crime, accessories before
the crime, and accessories after the commission of the crime.21
Under English law, this construction was often one of semantics
rather than practicality as punishments were nearly always identi
cal.22 As with many aspects of English common law, aiding and
abetting law crossed the Atlantic and became a part of American
common law.23
A. A History of Aiding and Abetting in American Law
By all accounts, the English formulation became overly bur
densome, ineffective, and eventually untenable.24 In enacting the
Alaska territory penal code in 1899, Congress began to chip away at
the common law and required that “all persons concerned in the
commission of a crime, whether it be felony or misdemeanor, and
ing Bracton, f. 142, as follows: ‘for it is colloquially said that he sufficiently kills
who advises’ (praecipit) the killing.
Id.
20. See id.; see also Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 15 (1980) (discussing
the early common law rule that an accessory could not be convicted unless the principal
offender was formerly convicted); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *33 (“A
man may be principal in an offense in two degrees. A principal, in the first degree is he
that is the actor or absolute perpetrator of the crime; and, in the second degree, he who
is present, aiding, and abetting the fact to be done.”). See generally Rollin M. Perkins,
Parties to Crime, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 583-623 (1941) (discussing the history of aiding
and abetting law).
21. See Standefer, 447 U.S. at 15. The court stated,
In felony cases, parties to a crime were divided into four distinct categories:
(1) principals in the first degree who actually perpetrated the offense; (2) prin
cipals in the second degree who were actually or constructively present at the
scene of the crime and aided or abetted its commission; (3) accessories before
the fact who aided or abetted the crime, but were not present at its commis
sion; and (4) accessories after the fact who rendered assistance after the crime
was complete.
Id.
22. See 2 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 231
(1882) (“Stated in the broadest and most unqualified way it came to this. There was no
distinction between principals and accessories in treason or misdemeanour, and the dis
tinction in felony made little difference, because all alike, principals and accessories,
were felons, and were, as such, punishable with death.”).
23. See Standefer, 447 U.S. at 16.
24. Weiss, supra note 18, at 1358 (stating that “with the introduction of sentencing discretion . . . the common-law distinctions became an unnecessary burden”); see
also Standefer, 447 U.S. at 16 (“Not surprisingly, considerable effort was expended in
defining the categories . . . . In the process, justice all too frequently was defeated.”
(citation omitted)).

R

\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-1\WNE107.txt

250

unknown

Seq: 6

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

4-MAY-10

16:04

[Vol. 32:245

whether they directly commit the act constituting the crime or aid
and abet [in] its commission, though not present, are principals, and
[are] to be tried and punished as such.”25 Congress continued to
move in this direction by enacting a similar provision for the Dis
trict of Columbia in 1901.26 Finally, Congress enacted a national
statute to address aiding and abetting in 1909, stating, “Whoever
directly commits any act constituting an offense defined in any law
of the United States, or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or
procures its commission, is a principal.”27 The statute was initially
codified as 18 U.S.C. § 550,28 and in 1948 it was moved to 18 U.S.C.
§ 2.29 The result was a criminal justice system that treated all per
petrators, be they principals or accessories, the same.30
In 1951, the statute was amended to change the language “is a
principal” to “is punishable as a principal.”31 This change, which
has been referred to by one commentator as “a pro-prosecution
amendment,”32 prevented the defense from arguing that a defen
dant could not be “a principal” because he was not part of the class
covered by the criminal statute.33 To be a member of a statute’s
required class is to be a member of the group described by the lan
guage of the statute that should be subject to that law.34 As dis
25. Act of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 429, § 186, 30 Stat. 1253, 1282; see also Standefer, 447
U.S. at 17-18 (discussing this change in law).
26. Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 854, § 908, 31 Stat. 1189, 1337; see also Standefer, 447
U.S. at 18 (discussing this change in law).
27. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 332, 35 Stat. 1088, 1152.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 550 (1940).
29. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683, 684.
30. Hammer v. United States, 271 U.S. 620, 628 (1926) (“Section 332 of the Crim
inal Code abolishes the distinction between principals and accessories and makes them
all principals. One who induces another to commit perjury is guilty of subornation
under § 126 and, by force of § 332, is also guilty of perjury.” (citation omitted)).
31. Act of Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655, § 17b, 65 Stat. 710, 717.
32. Adam Harris Kurland, To “Aid, Abet, Counsel, Command, Induce, or Procure
the Commission of an Offense”: A Critique of Federal Aiding and Abetting Principles, 57
S.C. L. REV. 85, 90 (2005) (“This was a pro-prosecution amendment, which eliminated
the defense argument that an individual could not be guilty as a principal under 18
U.S.C. § 2 when he lacked the capacity to commit the actual offense.”).
33. Id. This approach was already in effect in the wake of Supreme Court rulings
in Rothenburg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480 (1918), United States v. Giles, 300 U.S. 41
(1937), and the Seventh Circuit ruling in United States v. Hodorowicz, 105 F.2d 218 (7th
Cir. 1939), which all ruled that the issue of class was not germane to the discussion of
aiding and abetting.
34. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 18 n.11 (1980). The Court stated the
following:
In 1951, the words “is a principal” were altered to read “is punishable as a
principal.” That change was designed to eliminate all doubt that in the case of
offenses whose prohibition is directed at members of specified classes (e.g.,
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cussed in Standefer v. United States, this means that one need only
aid or abet a principal offender to be among the class covered by 18
U.S.C. § 2.35 It is not necessary for the offender to be a member of
a required class of the principal offense to be convicted of aiding
and abetting a member of that class.36 Further, Congress noted in
its legislative history that the amendment was intended to settle the
issue of “class” and not remove the equivalent status of the aider
and the principal.37 This distinction is critical because the statute
underlying the topic of this discussion specifies a required class of
any person “who has been convicted in any court of [ ] a crime pun
ishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”38 While
18 U.S.C. § 2 may seem plain in language, its application in practice
has been far from clear.39
B. Aiding and Abetting Law in Practice
The aiding and abetting statute is among the most often used
statutes in federal criminal law.40 This is because the statute at
taches to all participants in all federal offenses involving multiple
defendants.41 In fact, it is well established that an aiding and abet
ting charge need not even be listed in an indictment as it is assumed
federal employees) a person who is not himself a member of that class may
nonetheless be punished as a principal if he induces a person in that class to
violate the prohibition.
Id.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). The statute provides a note on legislative intent:
The section as revised makes clear the legislative intent to punish as a
principal not only one who directly commits an offense and one who “aids,
abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures” another to commit an of
fense, but also anyone who causes the doing of an act which if done by him
directly would render him guilty of an offense against the United States.
It removes all doubt that one who puts in motion or assists in the illegal
enterprise but causes the commission of an indispensable element of the of
fense by an innocent agent or instrumentality, is guilty as a principal even
though he intentionally refrained from the direct act constituting the com
pleted offense.
Id. § 2 note (Historical and Revision Notes).
38. Id. § 922(g)(1).
39. See infra notes 43-68 and accompanying text.
40. Weiss, supra note 18, at 1346 (“[B]ecause of the doctrine’s applicability to all
offenses and to all participants (other than the principal), the aiding and abetting stat
ute is probably invoked more frequently than any other federal criminal statute.”).
41. Id. at 1345-46 (“The federal aiding and abetting doctrine applies to ‘the entire
criminal code,’ so the ‘knowledge versus purposeful intent’ question can arise no matter
what federal crime is at issue.” (citation omitted)).

R
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in all such cases.42 Considering an aiding and abetting charge at
taches to every case involving multiple defendants, it is reasonable
to assume that the law in this area is clearly settled. However, with
regard to the required mens rea of an aider or abettor, this is far
from true.43 One commentator described the status of the law in
this area “as in a state of chaos—a chaos to which the cases seem
oblivious.”44 Another commentator observed that the law “has
been spinning out of control for quite some time, [and] has now
spun totally out of control.”45
A discussion of the progression of accomplice liability in the
federal courts could logically begin with Judge Hand’s opinion in
United States v. Peoni.46 In Peoni, Judge Hand set out the standard
for aiding and abetting law that is still used today.47 He stated that
in order to garner an aiding and abetting conviction, the accused
must “in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he par
ticipate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he
seek by his action to make it succeed.”48 This standard, known as
the “purposeful intent standard,”49 became universally adopted
when the Supreme Court endorsed Hand’s language in Nye & Nis

42. United States v. Neal, 951 F.2d 630, 633 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that “[a]iding
and abetting . . . is an alternative charge in every indictment,” whether it is listed in the
indictment or not); United States v. Ruiz, 932 F.2d 1174, 1180 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting
that it is clearly settled that a count of aiding and abetting need not be presented to the
jury if the evidence demonstrates that theory of liability); United States v. Armstrong,
909 F.2d 1238, 1241 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Aiding and abetting is implied in every federal
indictment.”); United States v. Duke, 409 F.2d 669, 671 (4th Cir. 1969) (finding that a
defendant may be convicted for aiding and abetting even if the indictment only charges
him with the principal offense).
43. See Kurland, supra note 32, at 85; Weiss, supra note 18, at 1351.
44. Weiss, supra note 18, at 1351.
45. Kurland, supra note 32, at 85 (“For decades, prosecutors have successfully
used pliant legal doctrines to impose criminal accessorial liability. Today, prosecutors
are inconsistently applying and misapplying these doctrines to the point of abuse, con
fusion, and unfairness.” (citations omitted)).
46. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938).
47. See Weiss, supra note 18, at 1349 (“The commonly held view is that the issue
was resolved in 1938, when Judge Learned Hand held in the case of United States v.
Peoni that the aider and abettor must not only know that his or her act will assist the
principal, but also want his or her act to assist the principal.” (citation omitted)).
48. Peoni, 100 F.2d at 402.
49. Weiss, supra note 18, at 1367.

R
R
R

R
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sen v. United States.50 In Nye, the court described Hand’s test as
“well engrained in the law.”51
While this concept may be considered “well engrained in the
law,” its application has not provided a clear standard to determine
the mental state of the aider and abettor.52 Interpretation of
Hand’s test has varied and led to a number of schools of thought
relative to the required mens rea for aiding and abetting.53 Simi
larly, federal courts have taken several different approaches on the
issue.54
1. Purposeful Intent Standard
Some courts, including the Seventh Circuit, have chosen a lit
eral interpretation of Hand’s Peoni standard and mimicked Hand’s
language from that decision.55 This is referred to now—as it was
previously—as the purposeful intent standard. Purposeful intent
has been described as a state of mind in which the aider not only
acted to aid the principal, but acted with a desire to bring about the
crime—a literal reading of Hand’s opinion.56
50. Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618-19 (1949). In this case, in
volving a corporation and its president accused of conspiracy to defraud the United
States of America, the Court endorsed Hand’s opinion, stating that aiding and abetting
“makes a defendant a principal when he consciously shares in any criminal act whether
or not there is a conspiracy.” Id. at 620.
51. Id. at 618.
52. Weiss, supra note 18, at 1367.
53. Id. at 1372-80.
54. Id.
55. See United States v. Zafiro, 945 F.2d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that
aiding and abetting has three elements, requiring “knowledge of the illegal activity that
is being aided and abetted, a desire to help the activity succeed, and some act of help
ing”); see also United States v. Hunt, 272 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Folks, 236 F.3d 384, 389 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating aiding and abetting is established by
showing that the defendant had “knowledge of the illegal activity that is being aided
and abetted, a desire to help the activity succeed and [participated in] some act of help
ing” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Lanzotti, 205 F.3d 951, 956 (7th
Cir. 2000))); United States v. Newman, 490 F.2d 139, 142-43 (3d Cir. 1974) (“Unknow
ing participation is not sufficient to constitute an offense under the aiding and abetting
statute. Rather, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defen
dant participated in a substantive crime with the desire that the crime be accom
plished.”); Weiss, supra note 18, at 1375.
56. See United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938); see, e.g., Hunt,
272 F.3d at 493; United States v. Hill, 55 F.3d 1197, 1204 (6th Cir. 1995) (“Because
aiding and abetting and the substantive offense are thus linked, courts correctly require
defendants to possess a degree of knowledge about and intent to further the substantive
offense.” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405 (1980);
Weiss, supra note 18, at 1375.

R
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2. Bad Purpose Standard
Several courts employ a modified version of the purposeful in
tent standard called the “bad purpose standard.” Under the bad
purpose standard, the aider must act not only with purpose but also
with an awareness of the unlawfulness of his action.57
3. Knowledgeable Approach
Other courts have applied a standard known as the “knowl
edgeable approach,” which has been broken down into several cate
gories.58 The first category allows knowledge of one’s actions to
suffice, except in such cases where the relationship between parties
is so tenuous that it must be clear that the aider wished for the
crime to come about.59 The second category of knowledgeable ap
proach requires purposeful intent except in matters that rise to the
level of murder or treason, for which knowledge will be the stan
dard.60 The third approach under the knowledge umbrella requires
that knowledge is sufficient whenever coupled with a substantial
act. This approach recognizes a distinction between substantial and
lesser acts: for substantial acts, knowledge will be sufficient, but for
lesser acts, the purposeful intent approach is appropriate.61
4. Derivative Approach
The derivative approach, which appears to be the approach ap
plied by courts that have ruled on aiding and abetting a felon in
57. See United States v. Brown, 151 F.3d 476, 486 (6th Cir. 1998). The court
stated,
[I]n United States v. Horton, 847 F.2d 313, 322 (6th Cir. 1988), the court indi
cated that in order to be guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 2, a defendant must “will
fully participate[ ] in the commission of a crime . . . . Participation is willful if
done voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something
which the law forbids or with the specific intent to fail to do something which
the law requires to be done, that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey
or disregard the law.”
Id. (second alteration and omission in original); see also Weiss, supra note 18, at 1375.
58. Weiss, supra note 18, at 1375.
59. Id.
60. See United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230, 1235 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc)
(noting that one who aids by leasing a boat or selling a small quantity of drugs to a
known drug trafficker would not be subject to the harsh punishment under the federal
“kingpin” statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848); Weiss, supra note 18, at 1375.
61. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 225 (1961) (“[G]uilt is personal, and
when the imposition of punishment on a status or on conduct can only be justified by
reference to the relationship of that status or conduct to other concededly criminal
activity . . . that relationship must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of
personal guilt.”); see also Weiss, supra note 18, at 1429-85.
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possession of a firearm,62 reasons that because the aider is to be
treated as a principal, the required state of mind of the principal
should attach to the aider and abettor.63 The other approaches re
quire review of the accomplice’s mental state, thereby creating dif
ferences between principals and accomplices rather than treating
them as equal offenders.64
If the derivative approach is used, one must study the underly
ing offense. Also, the question of whether the statute imposes ac
complice liability on its own can be determined by studying the
principal offense.
II. “FELON

IN

POSSESSION OF A FIREARM”—A DISCUSSION
THE PRINCIPAL OFFENSE

OF

In order to determine what mens rea is required for a convic
tion for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)—felon in possession of
a firearm65—it is imperative that the language, history, and purpose
of § 922 is considered. The statute has had several incarnations, but
the modern history of the statute centers around the passage of the
Gun Control Act of 196866 and its successor, the Firearms Owners’
Protection Act, passed in 1986.67 These statutes were proposed in
62. See United States v. Lesure, 262 F. App’x 135, 142-43 (11th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 711 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d
1281, 1288 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Canon, 993 F.2d 1439, 1442 (9th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Moore, 936 F.2d 1508, 1527-28 (7th Cir. 1991).
63. See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 881 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1990), withdrawn
and superseded in part on reh’g by 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Even though he was
actually convicted only of aiding and abetting others in their violation of section 1505,
aiders and abettors must possess the same criminal intent as the principals.”); see also
Weiss, supra note 18, at 1475. Weiss argues that this must have been Congress’s intent
when they chose to eliminate the distinctions between principal offenders and accom
plices. Id. at 1469.
64. Weiss, supra note 18, at 1469. Weiss concludes that a modified version of the
derivative approach should be used, in which the only exception to the derivative ap
proach would be in cases where the accomplice had acted with mere general-intent
knowledge and his participation was not substantial. Id. at 1486-87. The example given
is that of a gas station attendant, who pumps gas for a person, who then drives off to rob
a bank. Id. at 1487. In such cases, Weiss argues that a more substantial contribution to
the crime must be proven. Id.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006).
66. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 922).
67. Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922); see also JAMES B. JACOBS, CAN GUN CONTROL WORK? 23
(2002).
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response to public policy concerns surrounding gun violence and
gun possession rights.68
A. The Gun Control Act of 1968
On April 4, 1968, Martin Luther King, Jr. was killed by an
assassin’s bullet.69 Two months later, on June 6, 1968, presidential
candidate Robert F. Kennedy was also shot and killed.70 In re
sponse to these tragedies and concerns over increased urban vio
lence, Congress, at the urging of President Johnson,71 acted to
strengthen gun laws.72 The result was the Gun Control Act of
1968,73 the purpose of which was to aid law enforcement in fighting
crime while avoiding an unnecessary burden on lawful gun
owners.74
Included in the Gun Control Act of 1968 was a provision
known as the “felon-in-possession law.”75 This provision, codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), made it a crime for any person previously
convicted of a crime punishable by one year or more in prison (a
felony) to be knowingly in possession of a firearm in interstate com
merce.76 A violation of this code section is punishable by either a
fine up to $10,000 or ten years in prison.77 This regulation has been
referred to as “one of the most important pillars of federal gun con
trols”78 encompassing, along with convicted felons in its firearm
prohibition, anyone who “is a fugitive from justice; who is an un
lawful user of or addicted to marihuana or any depressant or stimu
lant drug . . . [or] narcotic drug or who has been adjudicated as a
mental defective or who has been committed to any mental
institution.”79
68. See JACOBS, supra note 67, at 23-27.
69. Id. at 23.
70. Id.
71. Gun Control Act of 1968 § 101; H.R. REP. NO. 90-1577, at 18 (1968), as re
printed in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410, 4425.
72. See JACOBS, supra note 67, at 23-24.
73. Gun Control Act of 1968 §§ 101-302; see also JACOBS, supra note 67, at 24.
74. Gun Control Act of 1968 § 101. Attorney General Ramsey Clark, in a letter
to the Speaker of the House, urged the expeditious passage of the bill to “insure that
strong local or State laws are not subverted by a deadly interstate traffic in firearms and
ammunition.” H.R. REP. NO. 90-1577, at 19.
75. See JACOBS, supra note 67, at 25.
76. Gun Control Act of 1968 § 102.
77. Id.; see JACOBS, supra note 67, at 23.
78. See JACOBS, supra note 67, at 25.
79. Gun Control Act of 1968 § 102.
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The Senate proposed amendments that would have only
treated as “felons” those offenders who were indicted or convicted
of “violent” felonies.80 However, the conference committee chose
to enact the House of Representatives’ version of that section,
which included all convicted felons and those under indictment for
crimes with a penalty in excess of one year in prison.81
In order to enforce the felon-in-possession law, the Gun Con
trol Act of 1968 included a provision that prohibited “any licensed
importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collec
tor to sell or otherwise dispose of any firearm or ammunition to any
person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such per
son is” a member of a restricted class.82
Throughout the eighteen years during which the Gun Control
Act of 1968 served as the governing law in this area, there were
concerns that the legislation proved too burdensome on the federal
government in parts and too burdensome on lawful firearm owners
in others.83 Finally, after years of pressure, Congress amended the
Gun Control Act.84
B. The Firearms Owners’ Protection Act
In 1986, after numerous attempts to reform and improve upon
the Gun Control Act of 1968, Congress enacted the Firearm Own
ers’ Protection Act, which strengthened certain parts of the original
act while relaxing others.85 As part of the process of drafting the
new legislation and responding to concerns about the effectiveness
of the 1968 Act, the House Subcommittee on Crime held hearings
80. H.R. REP. NO. 90-1956 (1968) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4426, 4428.
81. Id.
82. Gun Control Act of 1968 § 101 (emphasis added).
83. H.R. REP. NO. 99-495, at 3 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327,
1329. The report states,
There has been substantial concern since 1968 that the Gun Control Act
had serious omissions that limited its ability to keep firearms out of the hands
of criminals. Others have voiced concerns about the impact of enforcement of
the act upon sportsmen. In each Congress since 1968 legislation had been
introduced both to substantially strengthen the Act or to repeal or lessen its
requirements.
Id.
84. Id.
85. Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986);
H.R. REP. NO. 99-495, at 1 (“H.R. 4332 is designed to relieve the nation’s sportsmen
and firearms owners and dealers from unnecessary burdens under the Gun Control Act
of 1968, to strengthen the [Act] to enhance the ability of law enforcement to fight vio
lent crime and narcotics trafficking, and to improve administration of the Act.”).
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in the fall of 1985 and winter of 1986 in New York City, San Fran
cisco, and Washington, D.C.86 The subcommittee reviewed bills
proposed by the House and Senate and reported on potential con
tributions to the Act.87 The subcommittee noted with approval that
proposed legislation in both chambers would expand the language
of § 922(d), which until that time provided a penalty for a licensed
firearms dealer knowingly selling or distributing firearms to a mem
ber of a restricted class under § 922(g) of the Gun Control Act.88
The new statute would broaden the scope of that rule by removing
the word “licensed,” creating liability for any firearms dealers, li
censed or not.89
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) also re
viewed the Senate’s proposed legislation.90 While generally dissat
isfied with most of the proposed language, the ATF did approve the
proposed change to § 922(d).91 The ATF report notes,
Under [the] existing law it is only unlawful for a licensee to sell
or otherwise dispose of firearms knowing or having reasonable
cause to believe that such a person is in a prohibited category.
This proposal would close an existing loophole whereby qualified
purchasers have acquired firearms from licensees on behalf of
prohibited persons.92

The final language of the statute after the 1986 amendments
reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or otherwise dis
pose of any firearm or ammunition to any person knowing or
having reasonable cause to believe that such person . . . is under
indictment for, or has been convicted in any court of, a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . .93

Since 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) has remained in place and
unchanged.94 This is the language courts must parse in order to
apply the felon-in-possession law.
86. H.R. REP. NO. 99-495, at 5.
87. Id. at 8 (reviewing H.R. Res. 945, 99th Cong. (1986) and S. Res. 49, 99th
Cong. (1986)).
88. Id. at 15, 17.
89. Firearms Owners’ Protection Act § 102.
90. H.R. REP. NO. 99-495, at 16.
91. Id. at 17.
92. Id.
93. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) (2006).
94. Id.
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C. Modern Elements of the Felon-in-Possession Law
As the current construction of the law, the crime of being a
felon in possession of a firearm consists of three elements. First,
the statute requires that the principal offender be a person “who
has been convicted in any court of [ ] a crime punishable by impris
onment for a term exceeding one year.”95 This element has been
interpreted as a strict-liability offense,96 and thus the principal need
not be aware of his own status as a convicted felon to be included in
the class required by § 922(g)(1).97 Second, the principal must
“ship or transport . . . or possess . . . any firearm or ammunition.”98
Third, the firearm must be in “interstate commerce” as required by
the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.99 While
95. Id. § 922(g)(1).
96. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a strict-liability offense as “[a]n offense for
which the action alone is enough to warrant a conviction, with no need to prove a
mental state. For example, illegal parking is a strict-liability offense.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1188 (9th ed. 2009).
97. See United States v. Jackson, 120 F.3d 1226, 1229 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Based on
the law, it does not appear that the district court erred in giving the instruction that it
was not necessary that Jackson knew that he had been convicted of a felony.”); United
States v. Miller, 105 F.3d 552, 555 (9th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Caron
v. United States, 524 U.S. 308 (1998) (“We agree with the decisions from other circuits
that the § 924(a) knowledge requirement applies only to the possession element of
§ 922(g)(1), not to the interstate nexus or to felon status.”); United States v. Capps, 77
F.3d 350, 352 & n.2 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[A]s far as we can tell, no circuit has extended the
knowledge component of § 922(g)(1) beyond the act of possession itself.”); United
States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 604-06 (4th Cir. 1995) (explaining there was no evidence
that Congress intended to reverse prior law by extending the “knowing” requirement to
require knowledge of interstate nexus); United States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 80-82 (5th
Cir. 1988) (rejecting defendant’s argument that knowledge requirement applies to inter
state nexus or felon status). But see United States v. Reyes, 194 F. App’x 69, 71 (2d Cir.
2006) (unpublished table decision) (“[W]e do not find it necessary to rule on the issue
of whether the felon-in-possession statute requires the government to prove the defen
dant’s knowledge of his felon status.”).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Without delving too deeply into this element, as it is ancil
lary to the topic of this Note, “possession may be either actual or constructive.” United
States v. Craven, 478 F.2d 1329, 1333 (6th Cir. 1973); see also United States v. Garrett,
903 F.2d 1105, 1110 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Constructive possession exists when a person does
not have actual possession but instead knowingly has the power and the intention at a
given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through
others.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Taylor, 728 F.2d 864, 868 (7th
Cir. 1984))). Thus, in order to fulfill this element, the principal need not physically
possess the gun, but may satisfy the element through constructive possession. Garrett,
903 F.2d at 1110.
99. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. This prong will be
met if the firearm has ever traveled in interstate commerce. That is to say, even if the
perpetrator never moved the firearm across state lines, it would still be a violation so
long as the firearm was manufactured or shipped from outside of that state. See Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 563 (1977). This case predates the Gun Control
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these elements have been read without recent controversy regard
ing the principal offender, it is much less clear which elements apply
to an aider and abettor.
III. A DISCUSSION OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AMONG
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS

THE

The issue of whether one must have knowledge of the princi
pal’s status as a “felon” under 18 U.S.C. § 2 when the underlying
crime is being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) has prompted a split amongst the federal circuit courts
of appeals. The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have held that the
government need not prove any knowledge beyond that of willfully
aiding the possession of the firearm.100 In contrast, the Third and
Sixth Circuits ruled that the government is required to prove that
the aider knew, or should have known, that the principal was a
member of the class covered in § 922(g)(1).101 The Seventh Circuit
ruled in 1991 that no knowledge of the principal’s felon status was
required so long as the aider associated himself in the illegal posses
sion.102 This case remains good law in the Seventh Circuit; how
ever, the court has since ruled that knowledge of the principal’s
status as a felon is a required element of the crime.103 These rulings
are difficult to distinguish, and this Note will address both ratio
nales. The initial cases on both sides of the split arose in the early
1990s.104 The issue then lay dormant for nearly fourteen years
before cases in 2007 and 2008 brought the question to the forefront.
Several recent cases renewed the circuit split. The Sixth Cir
cuit joined the Third Circuit and, in United States v. Gardner, re
quired a heightened level of knowledge was necessary for a
conviction on aiding and abetting a felon in possession of a fireAct but was one in which the court ruled that proof that the possessed firearm “previ
ously traveled [at some time] in interstate commerce” was sufficient to satisfy the re
quired nexus between possession and commerce. Id. at 564, 577-78; see also United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350 (1971) (“[W]e conclude that the Government meets its
burden here if it demonstrates that the firearm received has previously traveled in inter
state commerce.”).
100. See United States v. Lesure, 262 F. App’x 135, 142-43 (11th Cir. 2008);
United States v. Canon, 993 F.2d 1439, 1442 (9th Cir. 1993).
101. See United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 716 (6th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1286-87 (3d Cir. 1993).
102. United States v. Moore, 936 F.2d 1508, 1527-28 (7th Cir. 1991); see also
Klein, supra note 17, at 653-54.
103. United States v. Samuels, 521 F.3d 804, 811 (7th Cir. 2008).
104. See Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281; Canon, 993 F.2d 1439; Moore, 936 F.2d 1508.
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arm.105 A year later, the Eleventh Circuit, in United States v.
Lesure, ruled in line with the Ninth and Seventh Circuits and held
that no knowledge was necessary beyond a willful intent to make
the firearm available to the principal offender.106 However, the
Seventh Circuit backed off its ruling in Moore, when in 2008 it
ruled that knowledge of the principal’s status was necessary.107
Clearly, no trend has taken hold in this area of the law.
A. Knowledge Requirement: Possession Only
1. Seventh Circuit
The original case in this area is United States v. Moore, a 1991
Seventh Circuit case.108 In Moore, the alleged aider was involved
as an associate in an armed robbery.109 Moore claimed that he did
not know the principal offender and thus could not have known
that the principal was a convicted felon.110 The court, citing Sev
enth Circuit precedent, implemented the Peoni two-prong test.111
The test requires the government to prove that the aider associated
with the principal and participated in the activity.112 The court con
cluded that the evidence, from which the jury concluded that
Moore acted with the other defendant, cleared the bar of the “par
ticipation” prong.113 As for the “association” prong, the court ex
plained that the aider must have “shared the criminal intent of [the
principal].”114 In this case, there was a finding that Moore know
ingly participated along with the principal in a string of robber
105. Gardner, 488 F.3d at 715-16; see also Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1286.
106. Lesure, 262 F. App’x at 142-43.
107. Samuels, 521 F.3d at 811.
108. Moore, 936 F.2d at 1508.
109. Id. at 1512.
110. Id. at 1513.
111. Id. at 1527. The court recited the established test:
[T]he aiding and abetting standard has two prongs—association and participa
tion. To prove association, the state must prove that the defendant had the
state of mind required for the statutory offense; to prove participation, [a] high
level of activity need not be shown . . . . Instead, there must be evidence to
establish that the defendant engaged in some affirmative conduct; that is,
there must be evidence that [the] defendant committed an overt act designed
to aid in the success in the venture.
Id. (first alteration added) (quoting United States v. Valencia, 907 F.2d 671, 677 (7th
Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d
401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938).
112. Moore, 936 F.2d at 1527.
113. Id. (“[W]e have previously determined that the evidence was more than suf
ficient to demonstrate that Moore was an integral part of the postal armed robbery.”).
114. Id. (citing United States v. Maya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 756 (7th Cir. 1988)).
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ies.115 The court then turned to the language of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1).116 The court recited the common understanding of the
required state of mind for that crime: “defendant knowingly pos
sessed the gun.”117 The facts of the case demonstrated that Moore
knew, or should have known, that the principal possessed the gun,
and it did not matter what else he knew, or did not know, about the
principal.118 Thus the court applied, while not specifically citing it,
the derivative approach119 to the aiding and abetting statute. In do
ing so the court found that that the evidence was sufficient for a
finding of guilty on the charge of aiding and abetting a felon in
possession of a firearm, even though Moore did not know the prin
cipal was a convicted felon.120 Thus the ruling in Moore requires no
determination of the alleged aider’s knowledge of the principal’s
status as a felon.121
2. Ninth Circuit
Two years later, the issue was in front of the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Canon.122 In that case, two men—both previously
convicted felons—were involved in a high-speed chase with police
during which shots were fired at the pursuing officers.123 The court,
in a less extensive opinion than that of the Seventh Circuit, did not
cite Moore. Rather, it discussed briefly an earlier aiding and abet
ting case, Nye & Nissen v. United States,124 which held that the gov
ernment need only prove that the aider wished to bring about the
115. Id. at 1528.
116. Id.
117. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. McNeal, 900 F.2d 119, 121
(7th Cir. 1990)).
118. Id.
119. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
120. Moore, 936 F.2d at 1528.
121. See United States v. Lesure, 262 F. App’x 135, 142 (11th Cir. 2008) (contrast
ing the rulings in Moore and Canon with those of Gardner and Xavier); see also Klein,
supra note 17, at 653-54. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the Seventh Circuit had
not directly addressed the issue but stated, “Also, while the Seventh Circuit has not
directly confronted this particular question, that court has held that a defendant in this
type of case need only share the principal’s knowledge that the principal possessed a
gun.” United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 714 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
This would seem to lead logically to a conclusion that no knowledge of the principal’s
status as a felon would be necessary.
122. United States v. Canon, 993 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1993).
123. Id. at 1440-41.
124. Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618-19 (1949). See supra notes
50-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of Nye & Nissen.
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act and that he sought to succeed in his action.125 Because the evi
dence supported the contention that Canon was willfully involved
in the act and thus implicitly wished to successfully bring about the
act, the court found that he could be convicted of aiding and abet
ting a felon in possession of a firearm.126 It must be noted that the
sparse opinion in Canon, while still valid law in the Ninth Circuit,
was subsequently criticized by that court due to a lack of analysis in
support of its finding.127
3. Eleventh Circuit
In light of the lack of support for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Canon,128 one might assume that the courts requiring knowledge
may be on the decline. However, the Eleventh Circuit faced the
same issue in United States v. Lesure and ruled that no evidence of
further knowledge was necessary for a conviction.129 The court first
concluded that, because the issue was not properly preserved at
trial, its review would be only for plain error.130 Citing both the
circuit split and lack of Supreme Court guidance on the issue, the
Eleventh Circuit held that “plain error” did not apply in this mat
ter.131 However, the court did take the opportunity to address the
issue that had split the circuits.132 The court cited well-settled law
that asserts that knowledge of one’s own prior felony is not an ele
ment of § 922(g), and thus the court “would be hard-pressed to re
quire the government to satisfy a greater knowledge requirement as
to a § 922(g) aider and abettor.”133 This path of decisions, weak
ened as it may be, still represents decided, current law in the Ninth
and Eleventh Circuits.
125. Canon, 993 F.2d at 1442 (“The government had only to prove [defendant], as
an aider and abettor, ‘associate[d] himself with [Canon’s crime], that he participate[d]
in it as in something that he wishe[d] to bring about, [and] that he [sought] by his action
to make it succeed.’” (first alteration added) (quoting Nye & Nissen, 336 U.S. at 619)).
126. Id.
127. United States v. Graves, 143 F.3d 1185, 1188 n.3 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Although
we acknowledge that Canon decided the question whether an aider and abettor is re
quired to know of the principal’s status as a felon, we have serious reservations regard
ing the soundness of that determination. In particular, we note that the decision
contains no analysis in support of its conclusion . . . .”).
128. See id.
129. United States v. Lesure, 262 F. App’x 135, 142 n.3 (11th Cir. 2008).
130. Id. at 141.
131. Id. at 142-43.
132. See id. at 142 n.3.
133. Id.

\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-1\WNE107.txt

264

unknown

Seq: 20

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

4-MAY-10

16:04

[Vol. 32:245

B. Knowledge Requirement: Knowledge of the Principal’s Status
as a Felon
1. Third Circuit
Three months after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s ruling
in Canon, the Third Circuit, in United States v. Xavier, became the
first circuit to require the government to prove that the alleged
aider possessed greater knowledge, beyond mere awareness of his
physical actions.134 There, the aider, the principal’s brother,
claimed that he was improperly convicted because the jury was not
instructed to consider whether he knew or should have known that
the principal was a convicted felon.135 The court agreed, noting
that “criminal liability for aiding and abetting a § 922(g) violation
stands on a different footing because it depends on the status of the
person possessing the firearm.”136 The Third Circuit did not ad
dress the required state of mind of an aider and abettor under 18
U.S.C. § 2 but, rather, pointed to the greater scheme of the Gun
Control Act of 1968.137 The court held that the standard for deter
mining the status of the aider and abettor should be found under a
§ 922(g)(1) violation because Congress had addressed the aiding
and abetting of this crime in another section of the statute—
§ 922(d)(1).138 That section states the following:
It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or otherwise dispose of
any firearm or ammunition to any person knowing or having rea
sonable cause to believe that such person—(1) is under indict
ment for, or has been convicted in any court of, a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year
. . . .139
134. United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1286-87 (3d Cir. 1993). The court
stated,
[W]e hold there can be no criminal liability for aiding and abetting a violation
of § 922(g)(1) without knowledge or having cause to believe the possessor’s
status as a felon. Unless there is evidence a defendant knew or had cause to
believe he was aiding and abetting possession by a convicted felon, it has not
shown a “guilty mind” under 18 U.S.C. § 2(a).
Id.; see also United States v. Canon, 993 F.2d 1439, 1442 (9th Cir. 1993).
135. Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1284, 1287.
136. Id. at 1286.
137. Id.
138. Id. (“Defendant was convicted as an aider and abettor under § 922(g) for
precisely the activity proscribed in § 922(d)—providing a firearm to a convicted
felon.”).
139. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (2006) (emphasis added).
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The court said that the behavior described in the plain text of
§ 922(d)(1) is effectively the same behavior that would be the
source of aiding and abetting of a § 922(g)(1) violation if it were
defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2, and thus Congress intended § 922(d) to
serve as the aiding and abetting provision for subsection (g).140
Therefore, “[a]llowing aider and abettor liability under § 922(g)(1),
without requiring proof of knowledge or reason to know of the pos
sessor’s status, would effectively circumvent the knowledge element
in § 922(d)(1).”141 The court ruled that for its decision to comport
with congressional intent, it must find that § 922(d)(1) is the correct
statutory language to look at to determine the elements to convict a
participant of aiding and abetting a previously convicted felon in
possession of a firearm.142
2. Sixth Circuit
After a fourteen-year period between decisions, the Sixth Cir
cuit, in Gardner, issued an opinion concurring with the Third Cir
cuit’s decision in Xavier.143 The United States v. Gardner court
chided the Ninth and Seventh Circuits for the lack of reasoning in
their rulings and concluded that the Ninth Circuit “provides almost
no support for its holding.”144 While recognizing that the knowl
edge of one’s own prior felony conviction may be presumed, and
thus is not an element to be proven in court, the Sixth Circuit
noted, however, that a presumption that a third party has knowl
edge of the principal’s prior conviction is not necessarily a given.145
The court reasoned that allowing the conviction without evidence
that the aider knew or should have known the principal’s status
would effectively write § 922(d) out of the statute.146
The court presented the following example to illustrate the
paradox: if a gun dealer sold a gun to a convicted felon without
knowledge or reason to have knowledge of his felony, he would not
be criminally liable for the sale of the gun but could be liable for
140. Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1286.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 714-15 (6th Cir. 2007). “The Ninth
and Seventh Circuits offer little reasoning for their conclusions . . . . The Third Circuit
decision, in contrast, is well-reasoned and we concur with it.” Id.
144. Id. As noted, this opinion has been echoed by the Ninth Circuit subsequent
to the Canon ruling. See United States v. Graves, 143 F.3d 1185, 1188 n.3 (9th Cir.
1998).
145. Gardner, 488 F.3d at 715.
146. Id.
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aiding in the gun possession.147 The Sixth Circuit decided that such
a situation was untenable, so no further knowledge could reasona
bly be required of the aider.148
3. Seventh Circuit Changes Course
A year later, this conclusion found favor when the Seventh Cir
cuit addressed the matter again in United States v. Samuels.149 Curi
ously, this court did not mention the previous Seventh Circuit
rulings on this question, including Moore. Rather, the court cited
other Seventh Circuit case law regarding aiding and abetting of
fenses in general that held that merely being present was not
enough to be found an aider or abettor and that knowledge of all of
the elements of the crime is necessary.150 Based on this rationale,
the court found that an aider “must know or have reason to know
that the individual is a felon at the time of the aiding and abetting,
and, in turn, must assist the felon in possessing a firearm.”151
While the Seventh Circuit previously held that no knowledge
of the principal’s status is necessary,152 it is now clear that the cir
cuit requires such knowledge.153 The court did not fully join the
Third and Sixth Circuits’ position in assessing aiding and abetting in
the context of § 922(d) but, instead, demonstrated another path to
which a court may reach a conclusion in this area and weakened the
block of “no knowledge required” jurisdictions.
IV. ANALYSIS

OF

COURTS’ RATIONALES

To accept 18 U.S.C. § 2 as the controlling statute for the al
leged crime of aiding and abetting a felon in possession of a firearm
without taking into account 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) is to essentially
write § 922(d)(1) out of the Code. However, accepting 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(d)(1) as the controlling statute without acknowledging the
broader scope of 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) may make § 2(a) a simple redun
dancy or perhaps even irrelevant. As a result, § 2(a), a provision so
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. United States v. Samuels, 521 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2008).
150. Id. at 811 (“To be guilty of aiding and abetting, an individual must have
knowledge of the underlying illegal activity and a desire to assist in the success of the
activity, and provide an act of assistance.”); see United States v. Moore, 936 F.2d 1508,
1527-28 (7th Cir. 1991).
151. Samuels, 521 F.3d at 812.
152. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
153. Samuels, 521 F.3d at 812.
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embedded in criminal law that it need not even be plead in an in
dictment, could be negated by a § 922(d)(1) charge.
This paradox makes the issue ripe for congressional interven
tion. While partisan squabbling may often result in a lack of clarity
in statutory language and a lack of uniformity in judicial interpreta
tion (and, indeed, in law review Notes),154 there are basic concepts
on which a common ground may be found. Justice Antonin Scalia
stated, in defense of the strict constructionist judicial outlook,
“[U]ncertainty has been regarded as incompatible with the Rule of
Law. Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the law
must have the means of knowing what it prescribes.”155 Two years
later, in a speech extolling the virtues of his colleague Justice
Thurgood Marshall, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. noted, “More
than any other recent member of the Court, Justice Marshall leaves
a legacy of powerful dissents protesting the curtailment of defend
ants’ rights—dissents with a vision of fairness and order that is stir
ring in its clarity.”156 While Justice Scalia is not often likened to
Justices Brennan or Marshall,157 there is a common thread running
through those quotes—the need for a sense of order and fairness
under the law.
This analysis will seek to find that common ground on this is
sue. One need not espouse any ideological view to conclude that
Congress must act to end confusion in this area of the law or that
the decisions that do not require a prosecutor to prove knowledge
of the principal’s status have created inconsistencies in the law. The
analysis portion of this Note will suggest an approach that will cre
ate a logical solution to this problem both in the short term and the
long term.
Finding such a solution involves several methods of analysis.
This analysis will first examine the legislative history of the statute.
The analysis will next examine the method of statutory interpreta
tion employed by those courts that have heard this issue. In doing
154. Stephen R. Klein in his Note on the subject wrote that “both gun rights and
gun control advocates alike would like to see uniform application of federal gun laws.”
Klein, supra note 17, at 658. Klein approached the issue from a “pro gun owner’s
rights” perspective, effectively concluding that a congressional amendment was neces
sary. Id. at 667.
155. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1179 (1989).
156. William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 23, 28 (1991) (emphasis added).
157. See generally Travis A. Knobbe, Note, Brennan v. Scalia, Justice or Jurispru
dence? A Moderate Proposal, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1265 (2008).
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so this analysis will conclude that the Courts of Appeals for the
Third and Sixth Circuits have offered well-reasoned arguments that
the statute, when read in its entirety, requires the secondary of
fender’s knowledge of the principal offender’s status.158 The “no
knowledge required” courts have read a “plain meaning” into the
statute, which, rather than simplifying the issue, causes greater
chaos in this area.159 Thus, this Note will advocate that the most
logical interpretation of this issue is that of the Third and Sixth Cir
cuits. While the Seventh Circuit has now reached the same conclu
sion, this Note will contend that its reasoning is not as complete as
those arguing for a knowledge requirement and it may create re
dundancies within the Code.
However, in adopting even the most logical approach offered
by the courts, questions remain as to the true meaning of this stat
ute. This Note will present several possible methods of interpreting
Congress’s intent in drafting the statute, all of which are viable. For
that reason, this Note will ultimately suggest that a resolution in this
area must come from Congress.
A. Analysis of the Legislative History
While the courts have not discussed the history of the statute,
they have offered two starkly different positions on the appropriate
burden of proof that a prosecutor must reach based on the text.160
Analysis of the statutory scheme demonstrates that Congress may
have unwittingly created one loophole while trying to prevent an
other. The legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) suggests that
when the language of that statute was changed from “licensed per
sons” to “any person,” the idea was to close a loophole that allowed
non-licensed dealers to sell or dispose of weapons to a felon, who is
in a prohibited class of firearm possessor under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1), without penalty under that clause.161 However, it may
be that this amendment actually increased the burden on prosecu
tors to convict non-licensed aiders. It would have been reasonable
to assume that the added knowledge element was only applicable to
licensed dealers, while all others were subject to the same mental
state as the possessor, under the former 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1).162
158. See supra Part III.B.
159. See supra Part III.A.
160. See supra Part III.A-B.
161. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-495, at 17 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1327, 1348-49.
162. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) (1970).
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This stance, as this analysis will establish, is untenable under the
current construction.
While Congress may not have intentionally created this loop
hole, to interpret the statute in any other way than to provide all
potential aiders and abettors with a requirement of knowledge of
the principal offender’s status would result in reading § 922(d) out
of the Code and create more chaos in this area of the law. This
point is not discussed by those jurisdictions that have heard the is
sue, but it is an important element to consider in making a recom
mendation on how courts should proceed, or in the alternative, how
Congress should react to confusion in this area of the law.
In analyzing these rationales, it is important to discuss the
methods of statutory interpretation employed by those circuits that
have heard this issue and the relative strengths and weaknesses of
their analysis as it relates to their interpretation of the crime of aid
ing and abetting a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922 (g)(1).163
B. Discussion of Statutory Interpretation
1. Plain Meaning of the Statute
It is commonly understood that the first step in interpreting a
statute is to assess the plain meaning of the language, if such a plain
meaning exists.164 The plain meaning approach means that courts
should read statutes with the view that Congress intended the
words to produce their ordinary meaning.165 It is well acknowl
edged that if the statute is plainly worded and easily discernable,
the court should end its analysis of the meaning of the statute at
that point.166 Thus, the “knowledge required” circuits determined
that there is no plain reading of the statute because to interpret
“plain meaning” in the manner that the majority circuits have is to
163. While this Note will discuss a number of methods of statutory interpretation,
the focus of this Note is a discussion of the interpretation of the felon-in-possession
statute.
164. See RONALD BENTON BROWN & SHARON JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY IN
TERPRETATION: THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT 38 (2002) (“[I]t is assumed that
the legislature probably used the words, grammar, and punctuation in a ‘normal’ way to
communicate its intent, so the words, grammar, and punctuation are to be given the
meaning that they would ordinarily produce when trying to determine the legislature’s
intent.”).
165. Id.
166. See id.
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simply apply § 2 to the felon-in-possession law, which would create
chaos in this area of the law.167
The decisions requiring knowledge of possession rely exclu
sively on the plain meaning approach when applying aiding and
abetting to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The courts reason that
§ 922(g)(1), standing on its own, does not require knowledge of
felon status, thus aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) does
not require knowledge of felon status.168
While this may seem like a plain reading of the law, this law is
not “plain,” and these decisions create problems unforeseen by
those courts. These problems arise because the statute does not
stand alone but, rather, within the greater statutory scheme that is
the Gun Control Act of 1968 and the Firearm Owners’ Protection
Act, enacted in 1986.169
It is troubling that courts have interpreted this issue in a man
ner that nullifies another part of the statute.170 As discussed ear
lier, § 922(d)(1) provides that anyone who sells or disposes of a
weapon to a person covered by a restricted class must knowingly do
so in order to be charged with a crime.171 Using Black’s Law Dic
tionary’s definition of “aid and abet,” which is “[t]o assist or facili
tate the commission of a crime, or to promote its
accomplishment,”172 it would be very difficult to argue that “selling
or otherwise disposing” of a weapon to a convicted felon would not
be assisting or facilitating the commission or promoting the accom
plishment of the crime of being a felon in the possession of a fire
arm. These are acts that help the principal commit the offense; by
their nature these acts have aided him. Even if the court were to
reason that aiding and abetting was something other than selling or
disposing of the weapon, could that action be reasonably seen as
more culpable than actually handing the felon the firearm? If Con
gress has determined that the act of selling or disposing is more
167. See supra Part III.A.
168. See supra Part III.A.
169. See Firearm Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449
(1986); Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213.
170. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
324 app. (1994) (discussing canons of construction including the problem with reading
one piece of a statute in such a way as to nullify another piece of the statute); see also
South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 510 n.22 (1986) (“It is an
‘elementary canon of construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to
render one part inoperative.’” (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979))).
171. See supra Part II.B.
172. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 81 (9th ed. 2009).
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culpable and thus a different class of offense, then they must pro
vide guidance in this area. This analysis seems far-fetched, and, in
fact, the courts did not make that argument.173 For these reasons,
the rationale behind the “no knowledge required” decisions fail.
2. No Knowledge Requirement Hypothetical
The following hypothetical demonstrates that this approach is
untenable. Assume that, subsequent to the decisions in Canon,
Moore, and Lesure, a registered, licensed gun dealer ran a back
ground check174 on a customer who had been convicted of a felony
but the check erroneously came back without listing a felony. After
the consummation of the purchase, the customer is arrested for pos
sessing the firearm. The customer is charged as a felon in posses
sion of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)175 and the dealer is
charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2.176 Under the Canon
Moore-Lesure rationale, the gun dealer could be convicted of aid
ing and abetting the crime because he willfully sold the gun.177
There would be no discussion of whether he knew or should have
known that the buyer was a convicted felon because the courts have
disregarded § 922(d)(1).178 If the jury found that the dealer in
tended to sell the gun to the principal offender, the dealer could be
found guilty of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and sentenced to up to
ten years in prison.179
173. See United States v. Lesure, 262 F. App’x 135 (11th Cir. 2008); United States
v. Canon, 993 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Moore, 936 F.2d 1508 (7th Cir.
1991). Although, in the wake of Samuels, Moore likely does not represent the Seventh
Circuit’s controlling decision in this matter. This Note will use this decision to demon
strate the weakness of those jurisdictions still not requiring the prosecution prove
knowledge of the principal’s status.
174. See generally James B. Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter, Keeping Guns Out of
the “Wrong” Hands: The Brady Law and the Limits of Regulation, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 93 (1995), for a discussion on gun background checks, which is beyond
the scope of this Note.
175. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006).
176. Id. § 2(a).
177. See Lesure, 262 F. App’x at 142-43; Canon, 993 F.2d at 1442; Moore, 936
F.2d at 1526-28.
178. See supra Part III.A.
179. See 18 U.S.C. § 2. While it may seem improbable that the buyer would be
arrested at the consummation of the purchase while committing no crime, this is cer
tainly a possibility. Imagine for the purposes of this example that the buyer’s parole
officer happened to observe the purchase and then notified a police officer. It is impor
tant to remember that the crime is possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. While
this is typically coupled with charges for other criminal acts associated with the posses
sion, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) stands on its own as a criminal offense and does not require the
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3. Knowledge of Principal’s Status Required Hypothetical
What if the same factual situation occurred in the same juris
diction, but in this case the prosecutor charged the dealer with a
violation of § 922(d)(1)?180 Assuming that the dealer used reasona
ble due diligence (a question of fact for the jury), he may be crimi
nally liable under 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1). The act committed is the
same and the penalty for a violation of § 2(a) in this circumstance is
identical to the penalty for a violation of § 922(d)(1). Both result in
a fine, a sentence of no more than ten years, or both.181 The only
difference is that the prosecutor would have a far greater burden
under § 922(d)(1).182 That being said, under what circumstance
would a prosecutor bring a charge under § 922(d)(1)? Considering
the greater burden, the statute would simply fall to the wayside.
Therefore, to apply the reasoning of the courts in Canon, Moore
and Lesure 183 is to write § 922(d)(1) out of the Code.
Assuming the rationale above, it is necessary to move beyond
the alleged plain meaning of the statute and venture into further
statutory analysis. When ambiguity exists between what the statute
means or which other statutes should apply, it is appropriate to go
beyond the text to determine the intent of Congress.184 To further
analyze the statute in front of them, courts should use common ca
nons of statutory construction.185 This analysis is important to the
discussion of this issue because it demonstrates the narrow nature
of the opinions that do not require knowledge of the principal’s
felon status.186
possession itself to be accompanied by another crime. See, e.g., Lesure, 262 F. App’x at
142-43.
180. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1).
181. Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), the penalty for a violation of § 2 attaches to the
principal offense. Both the principal offense, § 922(g)(1), and the other charged of
fense, § 922(d)(1), are punishable under § 924(a)(2) by a fine, no more than ten years in
prison, or both.
182. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to sell or other
wise dispose of any firearm or ammunition to any person knowing or having reasonable
cause to believe that [the person was convicted].” (emphasis added)).
183. See Lesure, 262 F. App’x at 142-43; Canon, 993 F.2d at 1442.
184. See EKSRIDGE, supra note 170, at 324 app.; Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on
the Theory of Appellate Decision and Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be
Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400-01 (1950).
185. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 170, at 323-28 app.; Llewellyn, supra note 184, at
401-06. Canons of construction, while not perfect, offer guideposts to ascertaining con
gressional intent.
186. Klein did not employ this practice in his piece on the subject. See Klein,
supra note 17.
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4. Canons of Statutory Construction
Although not referring to the canons of construction specifi
cally, it appears, based on their explanation, that the Third and
Sixth Circuits went through the process of analyzing the statute in a
broader context than did their counterparts.187 The Third and Sixth
Circuits began by investigating the statutory scheme.188 These
courts analyzed not only § 922(g)(1) but also the entire statutory
scheme under which it was written.189 This led the courts to a dis
cussion of § 922(d)(1).190 They reasoned that Congress must have
intended § 922(d)(1) to act in conjunction with § 922(g)(1).191
As one observer has noted, “When a statute is unclear with
respect to a particular question, lawyers and courts generally begin
their search for statutory meaning by asking the question: Did the
legislature intend this particular statutory provision to cover this
particular fact pattern?”192 In this instance, it seems apparent that
the general aiding and abetting statute was not specifically intended
to enforce the “aiding and abetting a felon to possess a firearm”
fact pattern.193 While § 2(a) may be broad enough to engulf this
fact pattern, it was undoubtedly not created with these specific facts
in mind, as it is meant to apply broadly to any offense.194
After reading § 2(a), the Xavier court ruled that if there is a
knowledge element to selling or otherwise disposing of a firearm to
a convicted felon, then there must be a knowledge element to aid
ing and abetting—which amounts, in many cases, to the same be
havior.195 This led the court to a discussion of another crucial
element of statutory construction—reading the statute in such a
manner as to avoid nullifying another part of the statute.196
As discussed in the previous section, the court reasoned that if
it were to implement the logic used by those jurisdictions requiring
no knowledge of the principal offender’s status as a felon, it would,
187. See United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 714-15 (6th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1286-87 (3d Cir. 1993).
188. Gardner, 488 F.3d at 715; Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1286.
189. Gardner, 488 F.3d at 715; Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1286.
190. See supra Part III.B.
191. See Gardner, 488 F.3d at 715; Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1286.
192. ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTER
PRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 7 (1997).
193. See supra Part I.A.
194. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
195. Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1286.
196. Id.; see ESKRIDGE, supra note 170, at 324 app.
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in essence, write § 922(d)(1) out of the Code.197 The court rea
soned that § 922(d)(1) would simply fall to the wayside if the same
behavior was governed by another, broader statute requiring a less
ened burden of proof and if that statute was preferred by courts and
prosecutors.198
The jurisdictions requiring no knowledge of the principal’s sta
tus never addressed this point in their analyses.199 This is particu
larly so in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Graves,
which criticized its own precedent for its lack of analysis, stating,
“Although we acknowledge that Canon decided the question [of]
whether an aider and abettor is required to know of the principal’s
status as a felon, we have serious reservations regarding the sound
ness of that determination. In particular, we . . . [see] no analysis in
support of its conclusion.”200 The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits—
the two standing rulings requiring no proof of knowledge of the
principal’s status201—may have found that § 922(g)(1) had no re
quirement of knowledge for the possessor, but they did not search
elsewhere in the statute to find other provisions relating to this par
ticular statute that did create a knowledge element relative to that
offense or aiding and abetting that offense. In fact, neither of those
courts nor the Moore court even mentioned the statutory scheme of
which § 922(g)(1) was a part.202
While these courts may argue that the facts of the cases in front
of them may not have involved selling or even disposing of weapons
to a prohibited party, the application of the law to those who aided
or abetted in a manner other than to sell or dispose of firearms is
dependent on the application of the law as it relates to sellers and
disposers. The Canon and Lesure courts failed to mention
§ 922(d)(1), which, like § 922(g)(1), was enacted as part of the Gun
Control Act of 1968 and amended as part of the Firearm Owners
197. See Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1286.
198. See id.
199. See United States v. Lesure, 262 F. App’x 135, 141-43 (11th Cir. 2008) (find
ing that the district court did not commit plain error and therefore refused to address
the issue); United States v. Canon, 993 F.2d 1439, 1442 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that “no
greater knowledge requirement applie[d]” but failing to discuss impact on § 922(d)(1)).
200. United States v. Graves, 143 F.3d 1185, 1188 n.3 (9th Cir. 1998).
201. While Moore has not been overruled, it is clear that Samuels controls in the
Seventh Circuit on this issue. See United States v. Samuels, 521 F.3d 804 (7th Cir.
2008).
202. See Lesure, 262 F. App’x 135; Canon, 993 F.2d 1439. It is also notable that
the Seventh Circuit did not mention the statutory scheme in either Samuels or Moore.
See Samuels, 521 F.3d 804; United States v. Moore, 936 F.2d 1508 (7th Cir. 1991).
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Protection Act.203 To ignore this provision was error and causes an
illogical, inconsistent application of the law.
Further, legal tradition maintains that in a case of ambiguity, it
is important to interpret a criminal statute in such a manner as to
favor the defendant.204 Unlike the jurisdictions in which no knowl
edge requirement exists,205 the courts requiring knowledge as an
element read the criminal statute narrowly and require a higher
standard of proof placed on the prosecutor.206 If Congress meant
otherwise, it must amend the statute. Citizens should not be pun
ished for a congressional failure to clarify. The appellate courts in
the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits instead chose the broadest and
harshest interpretation of the statute.207 Broadly reading a statute
that results in a ten-year prison sentence208 is to ignore this canon
of construction and is fundamentally unfair.
While there appears to be at least some ambiguity as to its pur
pose, the legislature certainly acted with some purpose in creating
and later amending § 922(d)(1). It is inappropriate to read a statute
in such a manner so as to assume that Congress has created a re
dundancy.209 In a situation such as this, where the legislative his
tory has led the courts down many paths and Congress has left the
public with no clear window into its mindset, it is up to the courts to
interpret the text as best they can to further consistency and logic in
the law. For these reasons, it appears that the minority jurisdictions
have concluded a far more thorough and conclusive discussion of
the subject matter and come to a more practicable and logical
result.
Several hypothetical situations demonstrate the soundness of
the jurisdictions that require knowledge of the principal’s status and
the weakness of those jurisdictions that do not. It is important to
203. See Lesure, 262 F. App’x 135; Canon, 993 F.2d 1439.
204. ESKRIDGE, supra note 170, at 324 (discussing canons of construction); see
also United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988) (“By construing § 241 and
§ 1584 to prohibit only compulsion of services through physical or legal coercion, we
adhere to the time-honored interpretive guideline that uncertainty concerning the am
bit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.”).
205. See Lesure, 262 F. App’x at 140-43; Canon, 993 F.2d at 1441-42; Moore, 936
F.2d at 1524-28.
206. United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1286 (3d Cir. 1993).
207. See supra Part III.A.
208. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2006).
209. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 170, at 324 app.; see also Kungys v. United States,
485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (“Thus, Justice Stevens’ concur
rence’s construction violates the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that no provi
sion should be construed to be entirely redundant.”).
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view the outcomes of these fact patterns not in the context of the
individual matters in front of the courts, but as they relate to future
defendants and the legal system in general.
5. Alleged Aider Advises Principal on Obtaining Firearm
In this example, assume that the alleged aider is not a licensed
dealer but merely an acquaintance of the principal offender. The
principal, knowing that as a convicted felon he is unlikely to be able
to purchase a gun legitimately, asks the acquaintance—without re
vealing why he cannot legitimately purchase a firearm—if the ac
quaintance has a gun that he can buy. Now assume that the
acquaintance does not have a gun to give the defendant but tells the
defendant he knows where one can be found.210 The acquaintance
gives the principal directions to a location where he can procure a
gun along with the name and phone number of the person who will
sell it to him. The principal uses that information to obtain the fire
arm. Subsequently the principal is arrested and charged with pos
sessing the gun as a felon. When asked how he came into
possession of the gun, the principal claims that the acquaintance
told him where he could obtain it. While it may be difficult to find
that the acquaintance sold or disposed of the gun to the principal
because he never personally handled the weapon, he certainly
played a part in the principal’s acquisition of the gun. Under the
“counsel” prong of aiding and abetting,211 the acquaintance is
charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). In the jurisdictions not requiring
knowledge, there is no discussion of whether the acquaintance
knew that the principal was a convicted felon. Without a finding
that he knew of the principal’s status, the jury convicts because the
acquaintance knowingly counseled the principal. This may or may
not seem like an unjust result (given that the aider was seemingly
involved in the illegal firearm trade, he is not likely a sympathetic
defendant), but the problem with the reasoning underpinning this
ruling comes when we consider the fate of the person who actually
handed the gun to the principal.
210. While this hypothetical may implicate other potential crimes, including aid
ing and abetting in the possession of an unregistered firearm, for the purposes of this
discussion, it is important to focus only on the charge of aiding and abetting a felon in
possession of a firearm.
211. The full text of 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) reads, “Whoever commits an offense against
the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commis
sion, is punishable as a principal.” 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (emphasis added).
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6. Alleged Aider Hands Firearm to Principal
In another scenario, assume that when the principal ap
proaches the acquaintance, the acquaintance does have a gun and
gives it to the principal.212 Following the same steps as existed in
the preceding scenario, when the principal is arrested he names the
person who gave him the gun. Noting that this action constitutes
“disposing” of a weapon to a convicted felon, the prosecutor
charges this defendant with a violation of § 922(d)(1).213 Because
the standard for § 922(d)(1) requires that the acquaintance be
aware that the principal is a felon, the burden of proof is higher for
the prosecutor.214 The prosecutor is not required to prove a state of
mind when proving that the acquaintance told the principal where
he could find a gun.215 However, now that the acquaintance actu
ally placed the gun in the felon’s hands, the prosecutor must prove
that the acquaintance knew of the principal’s status as a felon.216
Perhaps, as a matter of public policy, both of these characters
should be punished, but is it likely that Congress intentionally cre
ated a statutory provision that creates a lower prosecutorial burden
for someone who tells a convicted felon where he may find a fire
arm than for someone who actually hands the convicted felon the
gun? That seems unlikely considering the level of participation is
greater when one puts another physically in possession of a firearm
than when one merely gives advice on where to acquire a weapon.
But, alas, if one reads the plain language of § 922(d)(1) to require
knowledge, but applies § 2(a) to the counseling offense, this would
be the result.
A counter to this argument would be that Congress did intend
a distinction on these matters. Perhaps Congress presumed that the
transactions covered by § 922(d) only referred to transactions that,
besides being conducted with a convicted felon, were otherwise le
gal. However, the actions are so closely linked that if this is what
Congress intended, the statute should state that fact. As presently
stated, this approach does not appear sustainable. Therefore, the
212. While one may ponder other potential crimes committed in this act, includ
ing aiding and abetting in the possession of an unregistered firearm, for the purposes of
this discussion, it is important to focus only on the charge of aiding and abetting a felonin-possession of a firearm.
213. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1).
214. See id.
215. Id. § 2(a).
216. Id. § 922(d)(1).
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approach of the Third and Sixth Circuits offers the superior
rationale.
C. Flaws in the Cases Requiring Knowledge of the Principal’s
Status
The Courts of Appeals for the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Cir
cuits, ruling that the aider must have known or should have known
of the felon status of the principal offender, provide a much more
in-depth analysis than their counterparts. The Third and Sixth Cir
cuits appear to have considered numerous canons of construction
and explored, in a text-based manner, the statutory scheme and the
consequences of their rulings from a logical point of view.217 It ap
pears that the rulings of those courts have a good deal of support
from traditional canons of construction. However, this does not
mean those courts’ analyses were flawless.
The Seventh Circuit apparently did not consider the rulings of
its sister circuits—it did not even mention the other decisions or the
existence of a circuit split, including its own ruling in Moore.218
Further, the Seventh Circuit seemed to casually assume that in or
der to satisfy the requirement that a defendant knowingly partici
pated in an offense, he must be aware of each element.219 For this
proposition, the circuit cites case law that does not explicitly make
this claim.220 The Seventh Circuit notes that “[t]o be guilty of aid
ing and abetting, an individual must have knowledge of the under
lying illegal activity and a desire to assist in the success of the
activity, and provide an act of assistance,”221 and that the “[m]ere
presence at the time of the crime is insufficient to support a convic
tion for [aiding and abetting].”222 These passages do not conclu
sively indicate that the aider knows any more than that the
principal possessed the weapon. In fact, it is on the basis of similar
language that the courts not requiring knowledge of the principal’s
status based their opinions.223 Further, it is impossible to determine
217. See supra Part III.B.
218. See United States v. Samuels, 521 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2008).
219. Id. at 811-12.
220. Id. at 811 (citing United States v. Serrano, 434 F.3d 1003, 1004 (7th Cir.
2006); United States v. Stott, 245 F.3d 890, 904 (7th Cir. 2001)).
221. Samuels, 521 F.3d at 811.
222. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Bounty, 383 F.3d
575, 579 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also Stott, 245 F.3d at 904 (“To be convicted as an aider
and abettor, it must be shown that Mr. Ford associated himself with the activity at issue
and that he tried to make the activity succeed.”).
223. See supra Part III.A.
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whether the Seventh Circuit considered § 922(d) as there is no
mention of it in its decision.224 Perhaps they view this section as
redundant or perhaps they never considered its implications in this
area. Thus, while the Seventh Circuit has reached a practicable so
lution and seemingly overturned or at least clarified its ruling in
Moore, Samuel’s lack of support and failure to address alternative
arguments prevent it from controlling on this matter.
One criticism of the analyses of the Third and Sixth Circuit
Courts of Appeals is that the courts used statutory construction ca
nons exclusively.225 Heavy reliance on canons of construction may
be easy to manipulate,226 which is why some jurisdictions ignore
them and leave Congress the responsibility of resolving ambigui
ties.227 In this case, however, so many key canons of construction—
which hold together the logic of the Code—fall into place that it is
difficult to accuse these courts of selective reading. This is particu
larly so considering that the elements regarding restricted classes of
firearm possessors mentioned in § 922(g)(1) are similarly men
tioned in § 922(d)(1).228 It would be irresponsible to ignore this
language when Congress connected the two passages by
reference.229
A far more significant criticism of these courts involves the in
tent of Congress as seen through the legislative history of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922. Using legislative history in statutory interpretation is a con
troversial practice and is considered by some as an inappropriate
judicial exercise.230 However, for the purposes of this discussion, it
is important to analyze whether the courts’ analyses are in line with
congressional intent, as this is where the rationale of the Courts of
Appeals for the Third and Sixth Circuits can be called into ques
tion. The original language of § 922(d)(1) only required knowledge
of licensed dealers of firearms.231 In the Firearms Owners’ Protec
tion Act, the term “licensed” was dropped.232 It is important to
discuss why this change was made, as it may give the courts gui
224. See Samuels, 521 F.3d 804.
225. See United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 714-15 (6th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1286 (3d Cir. 1993).
226. See Llewellyn, supra note 184 at 401-06.
227. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 192, at 30-31.
228. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1), (g)(1) (2006).
229. Id. § 922(d)(1), (g)(1); see Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1286.
230. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 192, at 29-33.
231. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 102, 82 Stat. 1213, 1220.
232. Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1)).
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dance as to the purpose of § 922(d). None of the courts that have
ruled on this matter addressed the issue of legislative history. As
discussed earlier, the license requirement was thought to have cre
ated a loophole for offenders who were not licensed.233 In eliminat
ing this requirement, it seems that Congress intended one of three
possibilities.
The first possibility is that Congress did not understand the
aiding and abetting law or its application. The House Report states
that there was “an existing loophole whereby qualified purchasers
have acquired firearms from licensees on behalf of prohibited per
sons.”234 Considering that even after the amendment broadened
the statute courts still find that 18 U.S.C. § 2 applies to this offense,235 it is hard to fathom that a loophole existed that allowed
non-licensees to dispose of guns to prohibited classes without facing
an aiding and abetting charge. In fact, no case law supports this
charge.
Considering the rationales of the post-1986 courts, it seems far
more plausible that the burden of proof for prosecuting a nonlicensed provider was lower before the statute was amended. If
§ 922(d)(1), as enacted in 1968, specified that it only referred to
licensees, it would not be unreasonable to assume that all others
who aided a felon in possession of a firearm were subject to some
other statute, in which case they would almost certainly be prose
cuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2. This Note argues that great inconsisten
cies would result under the modern language if a knowledge
element was not required; there would be no such problem in the
pre-1986 version of the statute, however, because a distinction
could be made between licensees and non-licensees. In a case with
the same facts as Samuels, Gardner, or Xavier, a court could rea
sonably say that because Congress did not include non-licensees
under § 922(d)(1), they were not meant to have the same required
mens rea as a licensee. Because they were not granted this right, it
could follow that they are subject to the same mens rea as the prin
cipal. Thus, it may have been that Congress did not understand this
avenue or prosecutors chose not to employ it.
Second, it is also possible that Congress saw § 922(d) as the
aiding and abetting statute for a felon-in-possession charge and thus
233. H.R. REP. NO. 99-495, at 17 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327,
1343. The House Report included an ATF report that addressed the loophole. See
supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
234. H.R. REP. NO. 99-495, at 17.
235. See supra Part III.A.
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wanted to include all possible circumstances under that provision.
While there is no discussion in the legislative history of the inclu
sion of a knowledge element, it is possible that Congress assumed
that knowledge of the underlying crime was necessary for all aiders
and abettors in violation of § 922(g)(1) and thus wanted to be sure
that all potential offenders were covered by this provision. How
ever, if this were the case, it would follow that Congress would not
only have broadened the classifications of persons covered by
§ 922(d)(1) but also the conduct. Perhaps rather than “sell or oth
erwise dispose” it could have stated, “aid or abet in any way.”
However, because Congress changed only the class of person in
cluded in the statute,236 we are left with an unclear understanding
of its motives on this topic.
A third possible reason for a congressional amendment would
be to ensure that all aiders and abettors of a felon in possession of a
firearm to whom the knowledge element did not apply would now
have that protection. There is no evidence of this in the legislative
history, but, considering the tradition of including or allowing a
court to read a knowledge requirement into a statute, it is entirely
possible that this was on the minds of at least some members of
Congress.237 This may be especially true considering the substantial
penalty associated with this crime.238
The counterargument could be that Congress may have inten
tionally created a distinction. While this appears unlikely based on
the language of § 922(d), which includes the word “dispose,”239 and
the legislative history, which seems to show an intent to strengthen
the law against those who do sell or dispose a firearm, it is of course
possible that through its silence on the matter, Congress intended
to punish the counselor more than the procurer. If this was Con
gress’s intent—to create a distinction—then that body should in
clude language to such effect in the statute. At present, there is no
such language in either the statute or the legislative history.

236. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1).
237. Margaret Shaw, Note, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws: Rele
vancy of the Public Welfare Doctrine in Determining Culpability, 27 NEW ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 337, 349-50 (2001) (acknowledging that the harshness of a
penalty may affect the level of mens rea required).
238. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 924(b).
239. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1).
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CONCLUSION
This Note has demonstrated the ambiguous nature of aiding
and abetting law, particularly as it relates to the felon in possession
of a firearm statute. Decisions favoring an interpretation not re
quiring the aider to have knowledge of the principal’s offense may
be on the decline. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit—
formerly thought to favor this approach—now offers a practicable
solution.240 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit appears du
bious of—if not yet ready to overturn—its ruling on this matter.241
And the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued its opin
ion only after acknowledging that due to the split it could not over
rule the district court as plain error (possibly placing its opinion in
the realm of dicta).242 However, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
still employ the “no knowledge of the principal’s status” standard.
And even those courts that require the government to prove knowl
edge of the principal’s felon status—the Courts of Appeals for the
Third and Sixth Circuits, along with the Seventh Circuit, concurring
in result—can only guess as to Congress’s intentions.
Congress ultimately has the ability to resolve this matter. The
courts may offer different interpretations of the meaning of the
Firearms Owners’ Protection Act243 as it relates to aider and abet
tor law, but Congress, with one pen stroke, could end the ambiguity
by clarifying any of the possible reasons for the 1986 amendments
mentioned above or by providing any other clear solution it so
chooses. Congress need merely speak in § 922(d)(1) to exactly
which acts are to be covered by the provision. Congress should ei
ther clarify that 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) is intended to cover all areas
of aiding and abetting for a violation of § 922(g) or more specifi
cally describe what behavior it covers. While it may seem that the
behavior described by § 922(d)(1) is covered by general aiding and
abetting law, the statute does not cover such issues as “counsel and
240. See United States v. Samuels, 521 F.3d 804, 811-12 (7th Cir. 2008).
241. “Although we acknowledge that Canon decided the question whether an
aider and abettor is required to know of the principal’s status as a felon, we have seri
ous reservations regarding the soundness of that determination. In particular, we [see]
no analysis in support of its conclusion . . . .” United States v. Graves, 143 F.3d 1185,
1188 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1998)
242. United States v. Lesure, 262 F. App’x 135, 142 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is nota
ble to observe at the outset that ‘[w]hen neither the Supreme Court nor [we have]
resolved an issue, and other circuits are split on it, there can be no plain error in regard
to that issue.’” (quoting United States v. Evans, 478 F.3d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 2007))).
243. Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986).
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command” like § 2.244 Are these issues then to be decided sepa
rately? Congress, after eighteen years, chose to amend the Gun
Control Act of 1968 in an attempt to focus the language of the stat
ute. As noted earlier, it took many years and several attempts
before Congress successfully amended that statute. While similar
hurdles are likely to exist should further clarification be attempted,
this is a task that must be undertaken. Political difficulties do not
provide an adequate excuse for leaving the statute as presently
constructed.
Perhaps certiorari should be requested, but even a Supreme
Court review would leave certain questions unanswered. For exam
ple, neither of the two most recent cases addressed the issue of
counsel and command. The burden in this instance is on Congress.
Aiding and abetting a felon in possession of a firearm is accom
panied by strict punishment.245 Existing law dictates that an act
punishable by up to a ten-year prison sentence in one jurisdiction
may bring no penalty at all in another.246 The Third and Sixth Cir
cuits have provided a well-reasoned, logical ruling on the statute as
it stands. However it is not preferable to have courts choosing be
tween statutes and guessing at congressional rationale when Con
gress could amend this law and considerably clarify this area of the
criminal code.
James O’Connor

244.
245.
246.

18 U.S.C. § 922(d).
Id. § 924(b)(1).
Id.

